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PARADOX OF ESCALATION
 bidding-fee auctions
In  his  1971  study,  Dr  Martin  Shubik,  Seymour  Knox  Professor  Emeritus  of  Mathematical
Institutional Economics at Yale University introduces: “an extremely simple, highly amusing, and
instructive parlor game which can be  played at any party by arranging the auction of a dollar.”
Dr. Shubik lectured the Nato Scientific committee in London 1964 about the game. The paradox
of escalation auction method teaches a simple escalation, that Dr Shubik compares to military
escalations between nations. On a global scale, the inter-nation tensions and escalations have
significantly increased in recent times. The escalation is the most visible and loudest between
president Trump and the dictator of North Korea. 2017 August - “Tension rises in war of words
with US over North Korean threat to fire ballistic missiles near US Pacific territory of Guam”. Dr
Shubik's dollar auction game was converted into computerized format in the beginning of the
20th century, however the method was digitized incorrectly and important commonsense auction
initiation criteria was overlooked. I have successfully fixed and updated the digital version of the
dollar auction game, and I have confirmed my discoveries by interviewing Dr. Shubik on May
16th, 2016. I have applied for patents to my new useful discoveries, and I have already received
an Ex Parte Quayle Office Action granted by The United States Patent and Trademark Office,
USPTO.
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51 INTRODUCTION
This is my 48 year update to Shubik's institutional mathematics. In his 1971 study, The
Dollar Auction game A Paradox in Escalation and Noncooperative Behavior (Shubik,
1971, 110-113): Dr. Martin Shubik, Seymour Knox Professor Emeritus of Mathematical
Institutional  Economics  at  Yale  University,  introduces:  “an  extremely  simple,  highly
amusing, and instructive parlor game which can be  played at any party by arranging
the auction of a dollar.”  The dollar auction is a non-zero sum sequential  game that
illustrates a paradox brought about by traditional rational choice theory in which players
with perfect  information in the game are compelled to make an ultimately  irrational
decision  based  completely  on  a  sequence  of  apparently  rational  choices  made
throughout the game.  In this auction, bidding would naturally progress to EUR 0.99c
where the value of the prize is still more than the auction price but at this point, to save
a EUR 0.98c loss, the 2nd place bidder goes ahead and bids EUR 1.00 to break even.
At this point the bidder who was at EUR 0.99 can minimize his loss to EUR 0.01 by
bidding again at EUR 1.01. This cycle continues with both players wanting to minimize
their losses.  The sites auction new items, often for a fraction of their retail price, and
bidders pay up to EUR 1.50 for each bid. Unlike eBay, where you can bid for free,
users have to pay between EUR 0,40 and EUR 1.50 to place a bid. Bids automatically
rise by 1 EUR at a time, and some people make repeated bids. The last person to bid
gets the item, for however much it  is worth after what can be hours of monitoring.
Consider a MacBook Pro listing at a suggested retail price of EUR 1,799. Let us look at
what the bidding fee does. For each bid, the price of the computer goes up by a 0,40
Euro, and the operator collects 1 Euro. To get up to EUR 1.200, it takes 3.000 bids and
operator  gets  its  fee  for  each.  That  means  that  before  selling  this  computer,  the
operator took in EUR 3.000 in bidding fees. It can order the computer for about EUR
1.500 and thus make a profit  of  1.500 on the computer.  The model is a legitimate
license to print money, when applied in a transparent and honest manner. This means
no bidding bots or so-called shills are used. Shills, or "fake robot bidders", are always
employed in current bidding-fee auctions. Driving prices up with phony bids, they seek
to provoke a bidding war among other participants. My advantage over my competitors
is that I do not use robots, I have a Facebook-approved app for interacting with our
clients  and  we  use  Google  and  Facebook  verification.  Bidding-fee-auction  method
should be not confused with Ebay and Catawiki, which are highest offer or English type
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6of auction systems, where bidders make a maximum offer, of how much they are willing
to pay for the item and then wait seven days to find out if a higher offer was made. The
issue with English auctions are that they are too slow paced for the modern internet
user.
The Internet  is no longer  just  an information delivery medium. The Internet  is  now
considered as one of the biggest market place for sales of goods and services. Online
market place such as Amazon.com offers retail  shop like experience to its users to
purchase various items including books, electronics and even foods. Online auction is
another venue in the online shopping industry. For example, eBay.com allows its users
to sell and purchase all kinds of goods and services in one of its auction formats.
Recently,  online  bidding  fee-based  auction  system  (e.g.,  penny-auction)  has  been
introduced, offering different type of shopping experience to the users. The fee-based
auction system works different from the conventional online auction system. Unlike the
conventional auction system where a user is free to bid or raise the bidding amount on
the item, the user in the fee-based auction system is required to purchase a bid credit
in order to place a bid on the item. In other words, the user needs to pay a fee to bid on
the item. Each time the user bid on the item, the price of the item is raised by a certain
amount (e.g., 1 cent) and often resets a timer by certain time (e.g., 10 seconds) for
open bidding. When the timer runs out, the last bidder wins the item at the final price,
which is often substantially lower than the item's retail price.
The main problem in a typical fee-based auction is the lack of transparency during the
auction process. Because the timer renews every time a bid is placed on the item to
extend the duration of auction and the fact that the bid credit seller (i.e., the auction
operator)  gains profit  by selling additional  bid credits to the users,  the auction site
operator is often questioned for artificially extending the auction by outbidding the bid
placed by a legitimate user and/or shill bidding to drive up the final price of the item. On
the other hand, a group of users can manipulate the bidding process by allowing one
user to bid on certain item while  another user bids on other item, thereby causing
significant financial loss to the auction operator.
The game was digitized for the first time in 2007 by Finnish company Fiksuhuuto and
German company Swoopo. These early digitization efforts overlooked a commonsense
auction initiation criteria that even Martin Shubik forgot or ignored to mention on his
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71971 study. Therefore, the auction method has been incomplete for decades, as the
informal precommitment mechanism was widely accepted by the bidding industry. Dr
Shubik's  original  precommitment  mechanism  has  been  incomplete  and  crucial
information has been ignored for years. The informal precommitment mechanism, does
not take into account the count of users who have shown interest and precommitted for
a particular auction item. Therefore, the currently running systems use bots and shills
to make sure there is not only one precommitted bidder, who would obviously win the
auction with one bid, and cause significant financial loss to the auction operator. There
are front-end innovations and back-end innovations that are required to update the
game to be compatible with social media. These requirements are broken down into
further details in the following chapters.
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82 REQUIREMENTS
The software form of the bidding-fee-auction method has a set of requirements that are
necessary to operate the business successfully in the age of social media (Picture 1).
These include a new set of updated requirements, that are necessary to make the
game compatible with social media and most up-to-date web technologies.  To make
the bidding process compatible with social media authentication, frontend and backend
modifications are necessary.
2.1 Frontend Requirements and Improvements
There are huge problems and lack of transparency with the currently running bidding
systems. Outbidding the paid customers with fake user accounts is the accepted norm
of the current industry. 
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Picture 1: Prefunded bidding-fee-auction
9Our update is that 3rd party such as Facebook and Google handles all bidder session
authentications, as visible in picture 1.  The  auction operator will also verify each users
banking information  by requiring a nominal shipping fee before shipping auction wins,
i.e. precommitment requirement.
So bidders needs to authenticate themselves through their Facebook and/or Google
accounts.  This  way bidders  can be  sure  they  are  always competing  against  other
Google and Facebook accounts, and never against shills or fake user accounts created
by the auction operator.
I  do  not  want  to  limit  which 3rd party  network user  authentication  method is  used,
however generally, I want to provide a bidding system to all networks, including Twitter,
Instagram, Whatapp, Wechat and others.
Another major update especially visible to the end user, is the full integration of bidding
achievements with (Chou, 2015) Octalysis The Complete gaminification framework.
“Gamification is design that  places the most  emphasis on human motivation in the
process. In essence, it  is Human-Focused Design (as opposed to “function-focused
design”).”
The Octalysis framework breaks down the games humans play throughout their lives
into two brain hemispheres (Picture 2). With the right brain core drives representing
creativity,  self-expression,  and social  aspects,  and  the left  brain  core  drives:  logic,
calculations, and ownership. 
The dollar auction games unique countdown timer element represents the scarcity on
Octalysis, and the winning of an auction is an Accomplishment. The act of bidding itself
and the paradox of escalation is based on Social pressure, a right brain core drive,
where the appearance of being amongst the losing bidders visible to your Facebook
friends, is something that a bidder would like to refrain from, Avoidance, at all costs. 
Ownership, a left brain core drive, is linked to bidders filling up their bidding profiles in
their  entirety.  For  example,  rewarding users for  linking up all  of  their  social  media
accounts  to  their  bidding  account  is  behavior  that  is  rewarded  and  encouraged.
Complete bidders profiles are a signal of commitment and ownership.
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The empowerment, a right brain core drive, are linked to the bidding achievements and
bidding battle  victories,  strategies,  and  bidding combinations.  For  example,  placing
multiple bids within a specific time limit, 5 bids within 10 seconds, can be considered
aggressive or empowering bidding. 
Dr Chou further separates the right and left brain cores drives into white and black hat
gamifications, where the left brain core drives express:
“If something is engaging because it lets you express your creativity, makes you feel
successful through skill mastery, and gives you a higher sense of meaning, it makes
users feel very good and powerful.”
and the right brain core drives:
“On the other hand, if you are always doing something because you don’t know what
will happen next, you are constantly in fear of losing something, or because there are
things you can’t have, even though you would still be extremely motivated to take the
actions, it often can leave a bad taste in your mouth.”
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There are many famous bidders who have build a reputation over the years of their
bidding careers. One such well  recognized bidder is NotGonnaStop. NotGonnaStop
has a reputation amongst the bidding community and his bidding name is there to raise
fear amongst any bidder willing to challenge whether NotGonnaStop stops bidding or
not.
Based on the research provided by our  bidders,  we have learned that  the bidding
industry calls for a yet again a new type of auction state, known as the Dutch state.
When an auction item is set to Dutch state, the auction operator withdraws all claims
from the auction, and once the countdown reaches below 10seconds it will be never
raised  above  10  seconds.  The  Dutch  auction  state  is  the  high-activity  or  high-
engagement auction state and the software can be build to promote the Dutch auctions
via pay pay click advertising campaigns inside Google and Facebook. The fast paced
short timer Dutch auctions are really what the bidding public is mostly waiting for.
The frontend needs to be also customized by location, so that i.e. Portuguese internet
users can safely bid in their own language and currency. The frontend is best localized
by language and currency so that all world languages are equally presented.
A chat application will also be provided for the bidding application users. This chat can
be enhanced further into separated item specific chat rooms, and broken down into
further  specifications  depending  upon  users  classification  on  the system.  The chat
application is another good tool for creating the new sense of balance and openness of
the bidding system.
The automated bidding tool may be configured by the users to bid on the item at a
specified time (e.g., 1 second) prior to the expiration of the timer if the user is not the
last bidder in the auction. Or the automated bidding tool can be configured to place a
maximum number of bids, and be set to start after a specified time period has expired
or a certain state of auction has been reached. However, the seller of the item or the
auction  system  administrator  may  disallow  using  such  automated  bidding  tool  on
certain items.
The payment system integrations will also play a huge role in the overall success of the
project.  I  have  completed  an  underwriting  authorization  process  with  Facebook
payment systems, which I can be seamlessly integrated with the platform, even so that
users are able to purchase and refill their bidding accounts with bids without leaving
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Facebook. Also the bidding platform should accept Bitcoins and other types of crypto
currency as a source of payments for bids. Blockchain and Bitcoin enthusiasts are the
most active in social media and many of them are always researching for newest web-
technologies.
There are also significant improvements in the animating the gamification aspects of
the  bidding  method.  HTML5  and  Cascading  Style  Sheets  libraries  have  improved
significantly over the years and the animating the frontend appropriately will provide a
fresh new experience and look for this authentic and exciting bidding method. CSS3
animation elements should be used to animate and enlighten the user experience.
Bootstrap grid list items and cards and can be used to represent the bidding items
placed in the application index page. Bootstrap grid also provides a grid list item order
tag  that  can  be  used  to  prioritize  Dutch  mode auctions  over  other  auctions.  New
bidding items that will replace the already finnished auctions do not necessarily need
high priority over others as there are backend requirements keeping the newly listed
bidding auctions from distraction any high priority bidding auctions. Random rewards
game achievements can be used to increase bidders motivation in becoming the first
bidder in the first place.
The sorting,  filtering,  and searching for  bidding auction  items should  not  require  a
complete refreshing of the web page, therefore modern JavaScript preprocessors such
as  React  should  be  used  to  assist  updating  the  clients  bidding  views  without
interruptions.  React  library  also  comes  with  Redux:  an  object  or  property  state
management libraries. Bidding item states can be stored into Redux which in turn tells
React to render a new Dom for the browser when a bidding item state is changed.
2.2 Backend Requirements
A system and method for implementing an online bidding-fee-based auction system is
disclosed  herein  (Filppula  2012).  The  online  bidding-fee-based  auction  system
(referred hereinafter as the “auction system”) of the present disclosure employs the
pre-funding requirement configuration (Picture 3), in which each of the listed item has a
predetermined pre-funding requirement amount that must be satisfied to become a live
auction item eligible for bidding. The item's pre-funding requirement amount can be
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satisfied by receiving a sufficient amount of funds from the users. For funding any of
the listed items, the user receives a number of bid credits to be used for placing bids on
any of the live auction items. An adjustable countdown timer is associated with the live
auction item, and the users are allowed to bid on the live auction item before the timer
runs out. However, the remaining time of the countdown timer may reset to the default
value or otherwise be adjusted when with each bid placed on the item.
The auction system may further include a number of additional auction management
features to optimize the sales transaction via the auction system while preventing, or at
least substantially eliminating, the possible artificial manipulation of the auction by the
buyers,  sellers  and  the  auction  system  administrator.  Such  auction  management
features  may  include,  but  are  not  limited  to,  one  or  more  of  countdown  timer
management  features,  user  verification  features,  user  classification  or  level
management features, as well as auction control items, which are described in further
detail below. For instance, the countdown timer may be configured to incrementally run
at faster paced each time when the timer resets to the default  value preset for the
countdown timer. Also, the auction system may be integrated with third-party social
network sites, applications and platforms, and/or the auction system may include an
internal social networking platform that can be used in checking a user's eligibility for
bidding  on  another  user's  item.  Moreover,  the  auction  system may employ  a  user
account  classification/user  account  level  system,  in  which  the  users  belonging  to
certain classes or achieving certain levels  are provided with certain privileges or a
special set of auction controlling features to tweak some elements of the auction in
their  favor.  Various  other  features  and  mechanisms  may  be  included  in  various
embodiments of the auction system to provide more transparent and balanced fee-
based auction system for all participants (i.e., sellers, buyers and the auction system
administrator). 
The complete listing of back-end patent claims are provided on a separate attachment.
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3 RELATED MEDIA EVENTS HEADING
Date: Related Media Event
March 27, 2012 U.S. priority patent application
October 5, 2014 TurkuAMK ”paradox of escalation” bidding
event with 140 participants.
May 16, 2016 Email interview with Dr. Martin Shubik
December 15, 2016 Patent  Granted.  Ex  Party  Quayle  Office
action.
March 15, 2017 Simo  Häyhä  Hollywood  movie
announcement Finland, March 15th 2017.
July 7, 2017 7.7.2017  Finnish  Film  Foundation  meets
in  Simolankatu  regarding  Simo  Häyhä
movie. 
July 26, 2017 Multiple  fires  burn  across  Finland
including  Turku.  Finnish  police  suspects
the fires were started intentionally.
July 27, 2017 President Vladimir Putin visits Finland
August 18, 2017 First terror attack in Finland's history in the
city of Turku.
August, 2017 Tension rises in war of words with US over
North  Korean  threat  to  fire  ballistic
missiles near US Pacific territory of Guam.
Table 1: Related Media Events Timetable
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4 CLOSING CHAPTER
It has been ignored and wiped away from commonsense and human consensus that in
order  to  keep  the  bidding  between  human  beings,  and  not  “robots”,  the  auction
operator needs to be sure that there are atleast two humans present. The 3rd party user
authentication network used to apply on the method is not dependent upon whether
this commonsense requirement is really required, it is required at all times. It is safe to
conclude that the “two or more bidders” auction initiation criteria always applies, and it
is not dependent on the medium the bidding service is provided with. This improvement
is purely technical and it  is modification across multiple OSI networking layers. The
user authentication is handled by the sessions layer and the backed of the software is
naturally the application layer, the presentation layer represents the frontend and user
interface. It is specifically the application layer that needs to be aware that two or more
client sessions are open before it  makes sense to initiate the bidding. The backend
also needs to be make sure that the two client sessions should also have “bids” aka.
“bidding opportunities on their accounts.
I  am  currently  developing  a  new  second  generation  of  the  prefunded-bidding-fee-
auction method software. The new software will be built using the best practices and
guidelines  provided  by  Google  and  Facebook  and  built  mainly  with  mobile  first
approach.
During its lifetime the software has generated media attention organically(Arcticstartup
2016). I.E. the bidding software was recently recognized the Red Herring Top Europe
100  2018  award  and  I  have  been  invited  to  demo and  present  the  application  in
Amsterdam April 15th 2018. Some of the previous year victories and awards the bidding
application has achieved can be found on further references (Adweek 2015). 
Our bidding software has generated tens of thousands of users naturally. Financing
professionals  estimate  that  99.9%  of  new  applications  fail  mainly  because  the
application is not really needed by the market. Google, Apple and Facebook app stores
are filled with millions of applications and there are only a limited number of apps that
customers really need or want to use. The app industry as a whole has experienced
recent  changes  where  internet  users  do  not  install  new  apps  any  longer  for
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entertainment purposes, but rather stick with the basic useful apps provided to them by
default.
The future for the new generation of bidding-fee-auction applications is still on hold.
There are general business procedures that needs to be completed before the new
generation  can  really  fly  and  takeover  the  existing  bidding  methods.  I  have  made
significant  progress  recently  in  organizing  and  getting  the  deal  package  together.
Corporate financing can be overwhelmingly complex and bureaucratic.
I see a huge growth potential provided by the new blockchain technology. Especially
the initial coin offerings that are becoming more popular every year. Industry experts
are expecting for the United States government to accept the ICOs 2018, Initial coin
offerings, to become a perfectly legal and valid method for corporations to raise their
funding demands. It  is very exciting to see when Dr Martin Shubik's 1971 coin-toss
game will become widely accepted as a perfectly valid auction business model once
again. Anyways thank you for your attention, it was a pleasure to get to tell you about
my 47 update for Dr Martin Shubik's institutional mathematics.
Sincerely,
Mikko Lasso Filppula
Maastricht Netherlands
March 8th, 2018
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Interview with Dr. Martin Shubik
The following personal interview was conducted via email on May 16th, 2016. Dr. Martin Shubik is 
the Seymour Knox Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Institutional Economics at Yale University 
C Seymour Knox Professor 
Miko: I have a question for you, regarding your 1971 Study The Dollar Auction Game. Did the 
"'Formal Precommitment Mechanism"' in 1971, need to know that there are atleast two 2 or more 
interested players/bidders present?
Dr. Shubik: “In some versions yes, in other versions no.. this would require a lanthy technical 
answer to go into the tedails”
Miko: My further question would be regarding the versions where only "'0 or 1 bidders"' are 
present, (that are not included in 2 or more.)
How do you run an auction with 0 to 1 players?
Dr. Shubik: “There are technical requirement in producing alogically consistent and complete 
mathematical model. These include the formal definition of what happens when you have 0 or 1 
persons..the formal (and commonsensical) answer is that nothing happens”
The formal and commonsense answer in 1971 was that the auction was not initiated until at-least 
two or more precommitted players are present. 
It is a great honor and pleasure to update Martin Shubik's original bidding method to the age of 
social media. 
Listing of patent claims 1 through 10 
1. A method for facilitating a verified bidding-fee-based auction with formal precommitment 
mechanism, comprising: 
granting the user access to the auction system if the user credentials are verified; 
receiving one or more fund submissions from one or more users towards at least one item; 
providing each of the users with a number of bid credits corresponding to the fund submission by 
the respective user; 
initiating an auction of the item when one or more auction initiation criteria are satisfied for the 
item, wherein the auction is configured to end at an expiration of an adjustable countdown timer 
that adjusts its remaining time in response to receiving a bid on the item; and end the auction of the 
item when the adjustable countdown timer expires, with the user who placed the latest bid being the
winner of the auction. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more auction initiation criteria comprises: 
a threshold pre-funding requirement amount of the item; 
a threshold number of fund submissions received from the users on the item; 
a threshold number of users with fund submissions on the item; 
a threshold time period for satisfying the threshold amount of the pre-funding requirement amount; 
and a predetermined hold period after reaching a threshold fund amount for the item. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the remaining time of the adjustable countdown timer reverts to 
a predefined maximum time period in response to receiving a bid on the item. 
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the predetermined time value is successively reduced when one 
or more predetermined timer reduction criteria are satisfied. 
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the one or more predetermine timer reduction criteria comprises:
total number of bids placed on the item; 
total number of bidders on the item; and 
total duration of the auction from the initiation of the auction. 
6. The method of claim 2, wherein the remaining time of the adjustable countdown timer is 
increased by a predetermined time value in response to receiving a bid on the item.7. The method of
claim 2, wherein the adjustable timer is configured to expire based on one or more predefined 
external events. 
8. The method of claim 1 further comprising generating a user account for each of the users, 
wherein each of the user account is assigned with at least one user classification providing one or 
more of corresponding auction related features. 
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the user classification assigned to the user account is determined 
based on one or more user classification factors comprising: 
amount of personal information about the user provided by the user; 
accuracy of personal information about the user provided by the user; 
total number of third-party social network sites linked to the user account; 
social networking activities performed by the user; and 
transaction activities performed by the user. 
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the one or more auction related features comprise: 
a predetermined funding-to-bid-credit exchange rate corresponding the assigned user classification; 
an ability to use automated bidding tool; and 
an ability to use one or more auction modification tools allowed for the assigned user classification.
